(Prompted in part by reactions to an 'experimental philosophy' paper on Moral Responsibility and Determinism.)
We are choice makers by default. Unless we can turn off our unconscious (i.e., emotional) processes entirely, we cannot react with logical consistency to any assumption that in the end there's no such thing as choice, where we would also feel required to assume that choices are part of that deterministic world, yet at the same time be functionally illusory.
Our underlying "theories" are based on instinctive assumptions that all things (living or not) that act against our interests do so with some element of intent. Some seek to be trusted, some seek to violate that trust, some seek primarily to harm or eat us with any "trust" relationship being secondary to that. It's all about some aspect of trust, and trust would not come into existence in a determinate world. Everything there would already be in a permanent state of neutrality, no trust required, since there would be no contrasting distrust.
We can't deal instinctively or intuitively with a "logical" assumption that trust is not to be considered.
We also can't set up an "experiment" where we "accept" that people in a determinate universe would nevertheless act as if they had the right to choose. We "know" instinctively that such a universe would contain no such behaviors without the illusion of indeterminacy being a permanent part of that world. In which case we would act toward others accordingly, continuing to punish them as the illusion requires.
Cultural differences cannot in the end erase these instincts, only channel the ways that we choose to apply consequences. We can't be barred from choosing that some consequences are applicable.
This does not require us to have anything like an innate ‘moral responsibility module.’ We have an innate responsibility strategy that is archetypical.
And any differences that divide us into compatibilists versus incompatibilists (a false dichotomy in any case) are in themselves strategic responses based on our pecking orders, learned tactics, cultural differences, etc.
We don't have "compatibilist" intuitions as opposed to "incompatibilst" ones. We are basically incompatibilists by "nature" - we function probabilistically with an overlay of logically abstract certainties as to the inevitability of fate.
We act as if to outsmart nature for the short term, "knowing" it will outsmart us for the long term.